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First we define a probability on the set of all ground sentences according to [1]. Allow literals (not only atoms) to appear in a classical logic programming structures of rule, fact and query; here probabilities on ground instances are defined as conditional.

$\text{Rule}_L^\mu = \{C \in \text{Rule}_L \mid \text{for some ground } \theta \text{ probability of } C\theta \text{ is determined}\};$
 $\underline{\mu}(C) = \inf \{\mu(C\theta) \mid \theta \text{ is a ground substitution and } C\theta \in \text{Rule}_L^\mu\}, \text{ where } C \in \text{Rule}_L^\mu.$

Binary relation $C_1 \triangleright C_2$ between $C_1 = (A_1 \Leftarrow B_1, \dots, B_n)$, $C_2 = (A_2 \Leftarrow D_1, \dots, D_m)$ in Rule_L^μ takes place iff there exist a substitution θ such that $\{B_1\theta, \dots, B_n\theta\} \subseteq \{D_1, \dots, D_m\}$, $A_1\theta = A_2$ and C_1 is not a variant for C_2 ; in this case we say “ C_1 is more general than C_2 ”. Rules from Rule_L^μ which can't be generalized without decreasing the conditional probability $\underline{\mu}(\cdot)$ are called μ -laws; denote corresponding set by GLaw_L^μ .

$\text{Data}(\mathfrak{B})$ is a set of actual facts for 1-st order model \mathfrak{B} . A process of SLD-inference with probability estimations is replaced with *semantic μ -prediction* (or *P-prediction*) from the set of μ -laws which are valid for accessible data. Note: this concept has common features with semantic approach in programming (see [2] for analogies). As a result we obtain *the best prediction μ -law* for every ground literal, if semantic μ -prediction is determined. All necessary definitions are natural extension of those introduced in [3]. For each best rule $C = A \Leftarrow B_1, \dots, B_n$ used in prediction of some H we consider all $C\theta$ such that θ is a ground substitution, $\{B_1\theta, \dots, B_n\theta\} \subseteq \text{Data}(\mathfrak{B})$, $A\theta = H$ and $\{B_1\theta, \dots, B_n\theta\}$ is μ -concurrent (set of literals S is called μ -concurrent iff $\mu(\bigwedge_{A \in S} A) \neq 0$). Resulted set of described ground instances (over all literals) is denoted by $\text{Prdct}_L^{\mu,0}$.

THEOREM 1. *Let some ground atom H be semantically μ -predicted by ground instance $C_{pos} \in \text{Prdct}_L^{\mu,0}$ of the rule $C_1 \in \text{GLaw}_L^\mu$ ($C_{pos} = C_1\theta_{pos}$), while $\neg H$ — by C_{neg} ($C_{neg} = C_2\theta_{neg}$). Then the set of atoms from premises of C_{pos} and C_{neg} is not μ -concurrent.*

$$\Gamma_{\mathfrak{B}} = \{B_1 \wedge \dots \wedge B_n \rightarrow A \mid A \Leftarrow B_1 \wedge \dots \wedge B_n \in \text{Prdct}_L^{\mu,0}\} \cup \{A \mid (A \Leftarrow) \in \text{Data}(\mathfrak{B})\}$$

THEOREM 2. *Let $\text{Data}(\mathfrak{B})$ be μ -concurrent. Then minimal theory containing $\Gamma_{\mathfrak{B}}$ is logically consistent.*

[1] J.Y. HALPERN, *An Analysis of First-Order Logics of Probability*, **Artificial Intelligence**, no. 46, 1990, pp. 311-350.

[2] S.S. GONCHAROV, YU.L. ERSHOV, D.I. SVIRIDENKO, *Semantic programming*, **10th World Congress Information Processing 86** (Dublin), vol. 10, Amsterdam, 1986, pp. 1093-1100.

[3] E.E. VITYAEV, *The logic of prediction*, **Mathematical Logic in Asia, Proceedings of the 9th Asian Logic Conference** (Novosibirsk, Russia), (S.S. Goncharov, R. Downey, H. Ono, editors), World Scientific, Singapore, 2006, pp. 263-276.