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First we define a probability on the set of all ground sentences according to [1]. Allow literals (not only atoms) to appear in a classical logic programming structures of rule, fact and query; here probabilities on ground instances are defined as conditional.

$\text{Rule}_L^\mu = \{C \in \text{Rule}_L \mid \text{for some ground } \theta \text{ probability of } C\theta \text{ is determined}\};$   
 $\underline{\mu}(C) = \inf \{\mu(C\theta) \mid \theta \text{ is a ground substitution and } C\theta \in \text{Rule}_L^\mu\}, \text{ where } C \in \text{Rule}_L^\mu.$

Binary relation  $C_1 \triangleright C_2$  between  $C_1 = (A_1 \Leftarrow B_1, \dots, B_n)$ ,  $C_2 = (A_2 \Leftarrow D_1, \dots, D_m)$  in  $\text{Rule}_L^\mu$  takes place iff there exist a substitution  $\theta$  such that  $\{B_1\theta, \dots, B_n\theta\} \subseteq \{D_1, \dots, D_m\}$ ,  $A_1\theta = A_2$  and  $C_1$  is not a variant for  $C_2$ ; in this case we say “ $C_1$  is more general than  $C_2$ ”. Rules from  $\text{Rule}_L^\mu$  which can't be generalized without decreasing the conditional probability  $\underline{\mu}(\cdot)$  are called  $\mu$ -laws; denote corresponding set by  $\text{GLaw}_L^\mu$ .

$\text{Data}(\mathfrak{B})$  is a set of actual facts for 1-st order model  $\mathfrak{B}$ . A process of SLD-inference with probability estimations is replaced with *semantic  $\mu$ -prediction* (or *P-prediction*) from the set of  $\mu$ -laws which are valid for accessible data. Note: this concept has common features with semantic approach in programming (see [2] for analogies). As a result we obtain *the best prediction  $\mu$ -law* for every ground literal, if semantic  $\mu$ -prediction is determined. All necessary definitions are natural extension of those introduced in [3]. For each best rule  $C = A \Leftarrow B_1, \dots, B_n$  used in prediction of some H we consider all  $C\theta$  such that  $\theta$  is a ground substitution,  $\{B_1\theta, \dots, B_n\theta\} \subseteq \text{Data}(\mathfrak{B})$ ,  $A\theta = H$  and  $\{B_1\theta, \dots, B_n\theta\}$  is  $\mu$ -concurrent (set of literals  $S$  is called  $\mu$ -concurrent iff  $\mu(\bigwedge_{A \in S} A) \neq 0$ ). Resulted set of described ground instances (over all literals) is denoted by  $\text{Prdct}_L^{\mu,0}$ .

**THEOREM 1.** *Let some ground atom H be semantically  $\mu$ -predicted by ground instance  $C_{pos} \in \text{Prdct}_L^{\mu,0}$  of the rule  $C_1 \in \text{GLaw}_L^\mu$  ( $C_{pos} = C_1\theta_{pos}$ ), while  $\neg H$  — by  $C_{neg}$  ( $C_{neg} = C_2\theta_{neg}$ ). Then the set of atoms from premises of  $C_{pos}$  and  $C_{neg}$  is not  $\mu$ -concurrent.*

$$\Gamma_{\mathfrak{B}} = \{B_1 \wedge \dots \wedge B_n \rightarrow A \mid A \Leftarrow B_1 \wedge \dots \wedge B_n \in \text{Prdct}_L^{\mu,0}\} \cup \{A \mid (A \Leftarrow) \in \text{Data}(\mathfrak{B})\}$$

**THEOREM 2.** *Let  $\text{Data}(\mathfrak{B})$  be  $\mu$ -concurrent. Then minimal theory containing  $\Gamma_{\mathfrak{B}}$  is logically consistent.*

[1] J.Y. HALPERN, *An Analysis of First-Order Logics of Probability*, **Artificial Intelligence**, no. 46, 1990, pp. 311-350.

[2] S.S. GONCHAROV, YU.L. ERSHOV, D.I. SVIRIDENKO, *Semantic programming*, **10th World Congress Information Processing 86** (Dublin), vol. 10, Amsterdam, 1986, pp. 1093-1100.

[3] E.E. VITYAEV, *The logic of prediction*, **Mathematical Logic in Asia, Proceedings of the 9th Asian Logic Conference** (Novosibirsk, Russia), (S.S. Goncharov, R. Downey, H. Ono, editors), World Scientific, Singapore, 2006, pp. 263-276.